While a major goal of clinical risk management today is to improve patient care, the concept and development of risk management Published technical books describing standard risk management structure and function abound. We will not duplicate those efforts; rather, we want to tell of our personal experiences as we have participated in the growth and development of risk management related to health care in the United States. Most of these experiences have not previously been published, and we feel they may be particularly germane to the United Kingdom at a time when risk management is just beginning to become an important factor in health care.
History of risk management in the United States We found that the focus of risk management at any time depends greatly on the content of current lawsuits. Before the 1 960s most litigation concerning medical injury involved complaints against hospitals and their nursing staff (as opposed to their medical staff). Doctors were rarely the primary targets because the legal profession was not sufficiently sophisticated to confront the judgmental decision making that forms the basis of clinical management. Thus, when a risk management programme was developed for the hospital industry in the mid-1950s attention was directed towards patients' falls, treatment errors, patient misidentifications, retained operative sponges, and the like.' Since the largest hospital litigation losses at that time arose from retained sponges, initial efforts were devoted to that problem. Analysis indicated that the methods of counting sponges during surgery was ineffective, even though universally followed. A third sponge count at the time of skin closure was recommended and adopted and x as followed bv a precipitous drop in retained sponges and resultant claims. Interestingly, a similar analysis of instrument counting procedures concluded that, although adding a terminal count might prevent retention of some instruments, prolonging surgery unduly would be counterproductive. Balancing risks and benefits therefore became a key element in the development of clinical risk management. INC 
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Except for reported claims, there was no database to help to determine where the management problems lay and which of these was important. One of the first incident reporting systems was inaugurated for the California Hospital Association. It merely asked nurses to report unusual events occurring to and around patients -that is, events that were inconsistent with good nursing management. The resulting database disclosed that patients' falls out of bed were much too frequent. Bed rails were purchased, but these proved more of a hazard than a solution. Patients determined to get out of bed would do so anyway, only to find that the drop to the floor was much farther than before, producing more severe injuries. Lowering the beds so that the falls would be less severe only aggravated the nurses, who had to care for patients in stooping positions. Nurses' complaints of back strain led to the creation of high-low beds, which allowed the nurses to crank up the beds for attending to patients and then crank them down to avoid excessive injuries from falls. This development was the forerunner of the electrically controlled beds we have today.
Another problem at the time was losing patients when they were transported to radiology, surgery, or some other specialised care unit. Patients became separated from their charts (medical records), and, because they were often sedated no one could determine where they belonged. for both departmental interaction and the implementation of whatever preventive means might surface from the evaluation. This method therefore entails both awareness and participation of the institution in the claims management process. If the chief feels the case is "clean" the claims manager or risk manager may still seek independent consultation that avoids conflicting interests to ensure that the assessment has been appropriate. This process should not be put in the hands of solicitors. They are not trained for this purpose and they may not know how to ask appropriate questions. Solicitors and barristers are trained to conduct litigation; they may not be good claims managers.
Risk managers need to view medical and legal issues in malpractice litigation in a way that makes sense to doctors. To talk about duty, breach of duty, and proximate cause often leaves doctors bewildered. Thus we have learnt to approach these concepts differently. In clinical negligence there are two types of adverse outcomes.
The first type of adverse outcome is a new abnormal condition (such as an allergic reaction) caused by doing something to or for the patient (such as prescribing a drug.) A set of medical issues pertain to this type of outcome, a breakdown in any one of which may result in liability for the doctor: (1) accepting patients' autonomy. The duty to disclose the risks of a beneficial procedure sometimes seems antithetic to the desire to help the patient. Fortunately, we have been able to defend most lack of consent cases by emphasising the need for the procedure (benefit to the patient) and by establishing that most reasonable patients would have accepted the risks had these been disclosed. But we have not been able to cope successfully with consent cases based on misinformation (as opposed to lack of information) -that is, if doctors downplay the risks, they place themselves in an almost indefensible position should the patient sue, even though the sole intent was to benefit the patient.
The second type of adverse outcome is a worsening or prolonging of the patient's disease or condition caused by a lack of timely intervention (that is, a failure to do something). The medical or legal issues for such adverse outcomes are different. (1) worried about these communications, fearing they may be developing information that patients' solicitors can use against them. These clinical care judgments are "built in" expert opinions that would greatly facilitate the prosecution of malpractice lawsuits. In the 1950s and early '60s we thought that judges would understand that quality assurance activities were essential to improving care and that, since communications about these activities were not directly involved in any particular patient's day to day care, they would be considered irrelevant and inadmissible in a malpractice case.'8 A California appellate court proved us wrong, and the floodgates were opened for patients' solicitors to go on fishing expeditions in the entire clinical audit system for whatever evidence or opinions might be beneficial to their claims.'9 Doctors threatened to close down the audits unless they were assured their activities would not rebound against them. There was a danger that medical audit would be reduced to examining nonthreatening issues only. Risk management investigations into individual, potential lawsuits would not be impeded because of the attorney-client confidentiality and workproduct rules; however, injury prevention and other programmes to improve clinical care would be devastated. 
